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Prior to 1215, the people of England enjoyed certain legal rights,
privileges, and immunities that had been developed by custom, prac-
tice, and tradition which had been granted from time to time and
withheld and abused from time to time by the sovereign and the
barons in the Feudal State then existing.
A system of common law, decisions pronounced by the kings and
barons, magistrates, and perhaps other public authorities, had been
developed. The kings had encroached upon the rights of the people,
and even invaded the rights of the feudal barons. How much of
what we call today "due process of law" then prevailed in England,
is conjectural.
So in 1215, the barons, supported by the common people to some
extent, forced upon King John the so-called Magna Carta or Great
Charter. Among its provisions were the following:
(29) "No free man shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseised,
or outlawed or in any way destroyed, nor will we go
upon him, nor will we send upon him, except by the
legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land."
(39) "To no one will we sell, deny, or delay the right of
justice."
(40) "All persons are to be free to come and go in time
of peace, except outlaws and prisoners."
Other provisions restrained the powers, and the abuses of those
powers, of the crown, the courts, and the local sheriffs, constables,
and other minor officers. Under the charter the barons were to choose
25 of their number to be guardians (and enforcers) of the charter,
and on the death of any one of. the 25, the survivors chose the
successor.
King John died in 1216. With his death the need for further
opposition to royal authority was temporarily obviated, for the so-
called moderate party took control of affairs in the name of the
new young King Henry. The Charter was reissued (amended) in
1216, in 1217, and in 1225. One of the original four copies of the
Charter, the "Lincoln Charter," was reproduced in the Statutes of the
Realm in 1810.2
'Enc. Brit, Vol. 14, 14th ed. (1929), pages 630-634; McKechnie, Magna Carta,
Glasgow (1905).
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Our early English colonists imported with them to this country
the so-called then English Law of the Land or Common Law and the
prificipal elements of Magna Carta. The United States Constitution
retained for the American people the common law of England (as it
existed in 1791) excepting as the same was modified by constitutional
provisions or congressional enactments. The Wisconsin Constitution
retains the common law.2
This paper will deal with "Due Process of Law" under the
United States and Wisconsin Constitutions, and some federal and
more state statutes.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"***; nor shall any person *** be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; ***"
The Fifth Amendment is a limitation on the power of the congress.
It is not a limitation on the powers of the states.3
Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
"***; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
This provision is a limitation on the power of the states. The
two amendments on due process are identical and should receive
the same construction, and the United States Supreme Court holds
that "its construction governs when in conflict with State Court con-
struction." It has been held also that the Fourteenth Amendment
makes the first ten Amendments - the Bill of Rights - binding
on all the States.
The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified by the required three-
fourths of the state legislatures by 1868. Wisconsin ratified it in
1867. As a matter of interest, New Jersey and Ohio in 1868 withdrew
their ratifications; Georgia, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia first
rejected the amendment and later ratified it; Kentucky, Deleware, and
Maryland rejected the amendment in 1867, and so far as I am Aware,
these states never ratified it.
The first sentence and the first clause of the second sentence
of the Fourteenth Amendment (neither quoted) deal with "citizens";
the remaineder with reference to "due process" applies to persons,
which includes natural persons and corporations. Thus corporations
are entitled to "due process.' '
2 Wis. Const., Art. XIV, Sec. 13.
3McFaddin v. Evans-Snider-Buel Company, 185 U. S. 505, 46 L. ed. 1012 (1902) ;
State v. Lloyd, 152 Wis. 24, 139 N. W. 514 (1913).
4 State ex rel Borden Co. v. Dammann, 198 Wis. 265, 224 N. W. 139 (1929);
New York Fire Dept. v. Stanton, 51 N. Y. S. 242 (1898).
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Section ten of Article one of the United States Constitution pro-
vides in part:
"*** No state shall *** pass any *** law impairing the obli-
gation of contracts, ***."
Under this contract clause the right contemplated "must be a
vested right, and not merely an expectancy based on an anticipated
continuance of an existing law." The state cannot, by virtue of this
clause, divest itself by contract of the right to exert its governmental
authority in matters which, from their very nature, are of grave
concern for the preservation of society and the performance of
essential governmental duties.8
The "obligation of contract" in this provision means the legal obli-
gations of the parties to adhere to an agreement which, at the time
of contracting, the law recognized and made enforceable, not in-
cluding illegal contracts. The word "contract" is given its ordinary
legal definition. As to impairment, the question is not one of degree,
manner, or cause, but whether legislation encroaches in any respect
on the obligations of a contract or dispenses with any part of its
force. The value of the contract cannot be diminished by legislation.
Frequently the remedy on contracts, where it affects substantial rights,
is included in the guarantee, and the remedy cannot be altered or
materially impaired by subsequent legislation. Legal, not moral, obli-
gations are protected.6
This clause protects implied contracts as well as express contracts,
but it is doubtful whether it applies to quasi contracts. The public
welfare, even during periods of emergency and economic necessity,
does not justify disregard of this provision.7
Much more might be said on the subject of impairment of con-
tracts, but that constitutional provision is largely secondary in cases
arising under the "due process" provisions applicable to quasi-judicial
tribunals.
Neither the contract clause nor the "due process" clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibits or narrows the proper
exercise of the police power of the state and its local municipalities.
The "contract clause" is primarily a restraint on legislative bodies8
1 Dodge v. Board of Education of Chicago, 302 U. S. 74, 82 L. ed. 57 (1937).
6 Carder Realty Corp. v. State, 23 N. Y. S. 2d. 395 (1940) ; Auld v. Butcher, 2
Kan. 135 (1863); Cash Service Co. v. Ward, 118 W. Va. 703, 192 S. E. 344
(1937) ; Cleary v. Brolcaw, 224 Wis. 408, 272 N. W. 831 (1937).
7 Stewart v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U. S. 135, 29 L. ed. 599 (1885) ; Cary
Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364, 25 N. E. 92, 7 L. R. A. 765 (1890) ; Anders v.
Nicholson, 111 Fla. 849, 150 So. 639 (1933) ; Hoard v. Luther, 297 N. Y. S. 718
(1937) ; Brown v. Ferdon, 5 Cal. 2d. 226, 54 Pac. 2d. 712 (1936).
8 In re Opinion of the Justices, 261 Mass. 556, 159 N. E. 55 (1927).
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These provisions do not forbid the congress or the states from
changing the rules of evidence, as they relate to remedy only. So
likewise in respect to contracts and in other cases involving "due
process", statutes of limitation are subject to legislative amendment.9
The Wisconsin Constitution, Section Twelve of Article One, pro-
hibits the legislature from passing any law impairing the obligation
of contracts, and by Section Eight of Article One "due process of
law" is required in the apprehension and trial of persons for crime
(as amended in 1870).
Co-equal with the federal and state constitutional provisions on
impairment of contracts is the right of Congress under the Constitu-
tion."' "To establish *** uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies
throughout the United States ;" by virtue of which contract obligations
may be discharged in bankruptancy proceedings, and incidental to
which is the right of the state, as conceded by federal statutes, to
provide that debtors, in execution proceedings and in bankruptcy,
are to have a reasonable amount of property exempt from seizure
or sale to satisfy contract obligations.
Section Twenty of Article Eight, Wisconsin Constitution, provides:
"Any suitor, or any court of this state, shall have the right
to prosecute or defend his suit either in his own proper person,
or by an attorney or agent of his choice."
"Due process" to some extent, and perhaps incidentally, relates
to substantive rights, but its principal bearing is upon procedure,
that is, the conduct of a hearing or trial in any tribunal, whether a
court, quasi-judicial body, an administrative body, or a single public
official, and is a restraint also upon the legislative bodies and upon
executives and administrative officers in the performance of their
duties, statutory or otherwise.
The federal and state statutes quite generally and in considerable
detail prescribe jurisdiction, process, and practice for courts. "Due
process" procedure, as it affects quasi-judicial bodies and public offi-
cers, is not generally in any detail prescribed by statutes. The consti-
tutions do not define or prescribe the form of "due process." "Due
process" as especially applicable to public authorities other than
courts (but also in large measure as relating to courts) is prescribed
by common law with comparatively few statutory provisions. "Due
process" is secured by laws operating on all alike and not subjecting
individuals to arbitrary exercise of powers of government, by the
established principles of private right and justice. It is difficult to
9 Tabor v. Ward, 83 N. Car. 291 (1880) ; Davis v. Supreme Lodge, 165 N. Y. 159,
58 N. E. 891 (1900) ; Worthen Company v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56, 79 L. ed.
1298, 97 A. L. R. 905 (1935).
10 United States Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 4.
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define "due process" as applicable to all cases and situations, and the
peculiar situations in a given case may alter the requirements.
The courts hesitate continually to formulate a standard definition
of "due process." One of the widely accepted definitions in its pro-
cedural aspects is:"
"Due process of law in its procedural aspect requires a
notice and an opportunity to be heard in an orderly proceeding
adapted to the nature of the case, in accord with established
rules.
This definition includes the essential elements of (1) Notice; (2)
Opportunity to be heard or defend; (3) A competent tribunal; (4)
An orderly procedure adapted to the nature of the case, which is
uniform and regular and in accordance with established rules which
do not violate fundamental rights. These principles are not confined
to court proceedings but extend to every proceeding which may de-
prive a person of life, liberty, or property, whether the procedure
be judicial, administrative, or executive in its nature.
As applied to legislative power, "due process of law" requires
definiteness, a reasonable relation to proper legislative purposes, ab-
sence of arbitrariness, and equal application to all persons similarly
situated, including Indians, minors, incompetents, and friendly aliens. =2
Within these limitations, legislatures may enact an enforce laws
and regulations to protect the public health and safety and to promote
the general welfare of the people, bearing in mind that "all property
is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall
not be injurious to the community,"' 3
"Due process" issues are raised very frequently with reference
to the actions of federal and state lay boards, commissions, or other
administrative bodies, and in questions involving interstate Commerce
statutes and regulations, taxation, assessment of property, acquisition
of private property for public use, adoption of zoning ordinances, the
issuance and revocation of occupational and business licenses, other
federal, state and local governmental administration, and perhaps most
frequently in connection with the discharge of public employes, such
as teachers, policemen, firemen, and general city employes who have
permanent tenure in their positions and can be discharged only for
cause and after hearing before the proper tribunal, if hearing be
demanded.
The remainder of this paper will deal for illustrative purposes
with these quasi-judicial hearings before boards and commissions,
1 116 C. J. S. 1152-1155.
16 C. J. S. 1164.
13 16 C. J. S. 1156.
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comprised primarily of laymen unacquainted with court practice and
procedure.
Milwaukee public school teachers who have satisfactorily served
a three-year probation period attain permanent tenure until they
reach the age of 70; are subject to discharge only "for cause upon
written charges, which shall after ten days' written notice" to the
teacher, upon her request, be investigated; and the action and de-
cision of the Board of School Directors is final.' 4
In a similar manner, Milwaukee Vocational School teachers acquire
permanent tenure subject to discharge only "for cause" with the
right of hearing on written charges and on notice before the Vocational
Board.
All firemen and policemen hold their employment at the pleasure
(with limitations) of the respective chiefs, who alone can suspend
them for 30 days or less, but cannot discharge them except for cause
and after trial on a written complaint setting forth the reasons for
discharge by the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, if the
discharged fireman or policeman appeals from dismissal by either
chief to such Board, which, by a majority vote after the hearing,
must determine whether under the preponderance of the evidence the
charges are sustained; and the Board must make written findings
and decision and file a transcript of the evidence. By a peculiar
city charter provision, the discharged policeman or fireman may appeal
to the Circuit Court for a review of his case by serving a mere notice,
not a summons and complaint or petition; and in such review, the
court, as in other discharge cases, is limited to a consideration of the
jurisdictional questions, including the question as to whether there is
sufficient credible preponderant evidence to sustain the charges. An-
other peculiar charter provision applicable to firemen and policement
only is that they have no right of appeal to the Supreme Court, the
Circuit Court judgment being final. This absence of further appeal
is probably based on the necessity for community safety and the
semi-military discipline applicable to members of both departments. 6
Under similar statutes and charter provisions and City Service
Commission rules, general employes of the City of Milwaukee, elected
officials and a few other employes excepted, attain permanent tenure
in their positions after satisfactorily serving a 6 months probation
period, and cannot be removed, discharged or demoted, except for
just cause which shall not be political or religious. City employes
may appeal from the discharge by the appointing officer to the Com-
mission, whose decision and findings in the absence of jurisdictional
S4Wis. Stat., Sec. 38.24 (18).
15 Wis. Stat., Sec. 41.15 (12).
16 Milwaukee City Charter (1934), Secs. 29.09; 29.11; 29.14; 29.16; 29.19.
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defects, are final. The appeal must be taken within 3 days after the
discharge, and written notice of time and place of the hearing and
the reasons for the discharge must be given. Demotion in rank or
pay is uniformly held to be the equivalent of discharge for appeal
purposesY
Similar provisions are contained in the statutes with reference to
the teachers and many civil service employes of the State of Wisconsin
and the County of Milwaukee.
A lawyer participating in such discharge hearings, eiter in support
of the discharge or in defense, must become familiar with the special
statutory provisions applicable to the given case and the rules of the
public body conducting the hearing as they relate to the requirements
of "due process"; ascertain whether the power to discharge is a
single officer or a public body; investigate the written charges or
reasons for the discharge to ascertain whether they come expressly
or impliedly within those only very generally prescribed in the statutes
or charter; and he must investigate thoroughly the facts to ascertain
whether any substantial cause for dismissal exists as distinguished
from nominal. Both defending and prosecuting lawyers must de-
termine whether the whole proceeding was instituted as a mere sub-
terfuge on the part of the discharging officer for reasons of personal
enmity or prejudice to remove a faithful public servant from his
position.
The essential elements of "due process" are for the benefit of the
discharged employe, not for the discharging officer or the tribunal.
It is incumbent upon the public body hearing the proceeding to accord
"due process" in all cases. Any applicable statute or rule that does
not accord to the discharged employe the four essential elements
of "due process" above enumerated would violate the constitutional
guarantee and be ample cause for the vacating of any action of the
body adverse to the accused.
Unless the statutes applicable provide to the contrary, in the
conduct of the hearing the following requirements should be observed,
and the following rights and privileges should be accorded to the
employe:
(1) The hearing must be conducted by the full board or commis-
sion unless the statutes expressly authorizes a committee to act. The
majority vote of the tribunal is decisive.
(2) Where a committee conducts the hearing, its findings and
decisions must be reported, together with a full report of the pro-
ceedings, including transcript of testimony, to the full board or
commission for its consideration and final action.
1, Wis. Star., Sec. f6.68.
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(3) It is usually optional to have the testimony reported.
(4) The dischargee has a right to have his own reporter report
the proceedings, at his own expense, even though the public body
provides an official reporter.
(5) The hearing tribunal should have a clerk or secretary to
keep appropriate minutes of its proceedings, unless minutes are kept
by a reporter. Frequently bolth reporter and clerk are employed.
(6) The hearing must be open to the public, excepting only that
the public may be termporarily excluded for good reasons in the
discretion of the tribunal for part or all of the testimony of par-
ticular witnesses. The occasions justifying temporary closing of the
hearing are few. The committee cannot of its own motion conduct a
closed hearing, nor can it do so at the request of the dischargee
except for compelling reasons.
(7) Adequate written notice of the time and place of the hearing
must be given to the dischargee together with a copy of the charges;
and a copy of the charges might well be furnished to each member
of the tribunal so that they as laymen can conveniently refer to the
charges as the evidence progresses and so that by reference to the
charges the members of the tribunal can determine finally which
charges are proved and which are not. The dischargee has a right
to be heard upon the question as to whether the charges are
sufficiently specific and clear, and on occasion may be entitled to a
bill of particulars. The dischargee may file a written answer to the
charges, but he cannot be compelled to do so unless the statute
so requires. The dischargee may state on the record, without filing
a written answer, whether he admits or denies any or all of the
charges.
(8) The tribunal, except as restricted by statute, has broad power
to determine its own manner of procedure. It is optional for the
tribunal to request a city or county attorney to examine the witnesses
in support of the charges and cross-examine the witnesses called in
defense. The public atorney must demean himself in a quasi-judicial
manner. The public body and the discharging authority have no
power to engage a private attorney to prosecute the charges.
(9) It is proper that the discharging officer, even though not a
lawyer, put in the evidence, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and
make an oral argument.
(10) The dischargee may be represented by counsel at his own
expense, if he so desires; and, if not represented by counsel, he has
the right to examine himself and nis own witnesses, cross-examine
adverse witnesses, and argue orally. Even though unable to afford
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counsel himself, he is not entitled in civil proceedings to have counsel
at public expense, but he has that right only in criminal cases.
(11) Witnesses in support of the charges should be first heard;
then the defense witnesses; then rebuttal witnesses. The discharging
officer can testify himself; and the dischargee can testify in his own
defense, all by way of denial, refutation, or explanation of the charges.
Witnesses may be called adversely. A member of the tribunal in ex-
ceptional cases may testify.
(12) All witnesses must be sworn, either by the chairman or
a member of the tribunal. Witnesses declining to be sworn may
affirm. All witnesses are subject to cross-examination and to segre-
gation.
(13) Both sides have the right of subpoena, including duces
tecum. Many tribunals have express statutory power to issue their
own subpoenas.
(14) Tribunal members may interrogate witnesses. Opinion evi-
dence may be offered; and if occasion arises character and impeach-
ment evidence is admissible.
(15) It is proper during the course of the hearing that the
chairman of the tribunal rule on the admissibility of evidence and on
other questions, unless another member of the tribunal or the dis-
chargee should raise a question as to the propriety of the chairman's
ruling, and in that event the whole tribunal should make the ruling
by a majority vote.
(16) After both sides rest, an opportunity, reasonably limited
in time, should be given both sides for oral argument, including re-
buttal, as to the facts and the law, unless waived.
(17) As to admissibility of evidence: (a) all testimony must
be competent, relevant, and material to the charges; (b) hearsay
evidence should be excluded; (c) conversations with deceased persons
should generally be excluded; (d) testimony on matters remote in time
should be excluded; and (e) letters, memoranda, and reports may
be received as exhibits.
(18) In ruling upon the admissibility of evidence, and on other
questions that arise, the tribunal must bear in mind that the dis-
chargee is entitled to a full, fair, and impartial hearing and to
"due process."
(19) To disqualify a member from sitting, any bias, prejudice
or prejudgment must usually be shown intrinsically, not extrinsically,
on the record during the hearing, as the qualifications of tribunal
members are not subject to collateral attack and generally only
direct pecuniary interest in the result of the proceeding will dis-
1946]
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qualify a member. Affidavits of prejudice and change of venue
are not provided by statute. Sometimes, of necessity, the matter
must be heard and determined by a tribunal all or a majority of
whose members are prejudiced, when no other tribunal having juris-
diction exists. Many tests as to qualifications applicable to jurors
are wholly inapplicable to the members. The remaining members of a
tribunal have no power to examine into and pass upon the alleged
bias or prejudice of a fellow member.
(20) If the dischargee satisfactorily answers, refutes, or explains
all the charges assigned for his removal, he cannot legally be removed.
Should the tribunal find that in substance the charges have been
proved, that is, sufficient charges in the law to warrant removal, it
is not mandatory on the tribunal to discharge. The tribunal would
still be free to dismiss the charges and reinstate the dischargee if in
their judgment and discretion they found it proper.
(21) All members of the tribunal should remain in the room
while testimony is offered and arguments are made, excepting only
as a member may for good cause leave the hearing for a brief time.
If it becomes necessary for any member to be absent from the
hearing for any length of time and he were to participate in making
the findings and decision, it would also be necessary to continue the
hearing to a later time when all members could be present. When a
member is absent for a brief period only, the reporter should read
to him the testimony taken in his absence. Some statutes prescribe
a time limit for completion of the hearing and the decision. This
time limit may be jurisdictional.
(22) After completion of the testimony and argument, the tri-
bunal should by itself deliberate on the matter; that is, consider and
weigh the evidence offered by both sides and the arguments pro
and con, and give all the testimony and arguments full, fair, and
unbiased consideration.
(23) The tribunal is the judge of the veracity of all witnesses,
and in sharp conflicts of testimony on material points the tribunal de-
termines which testimony is credible and which is incredible. The
tribunal can believe the testimony of any one witness against that
of any number of witnesses who give testimony to the contrary. The
number of witnesses on a given contraverted point is not controlling,
the credibility of any and all witnesses being the material consideration.
(24) The charges should be proved to the satisfaction of the
members of the tribunal and generally by fair prepojnderence of the
credible evidence. The "burden of proof" on any contraverted ma-
terial issue of fact on the charges is upon the discharging officer, and
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such burden as to any affirmative defensive issue of fact is upon
the dischargee.
(25) The "degree of proof" required is that of preponderance
of evidence to a reasonable certainty on any given material fact and
on the charges as a whole. Should the charges involve fraud, clear and
satisfactory evidence in proof thereof is probably required. Should
the charges involve the ocmmission of a crime, the degree of proof
required in a civil proceeding would still be that of preponderance
of evidence rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt.
(26) All charges need not be proved, but charges sufficient to
warrant discharge must be proved; and in passing upon the sufficiency
of charges the tribunal must act with fairness to the dischargee and
in what it believes to be in the best interests of the public service,
considering the duties and responsibilities of the position involved
and other appropriate factors.
(27) The tribunal must always bear in mind that charges are
merely charges; that charges as of themselves are not proof; that
the charges cannot be presumed to be true; that the charges must
be established by credible evidence.
(28) "Preponderance of evidence" applicable here is the same
as in a judicial proceeding.
(29) In determining the weight and convincing power of evi-
dence, the tribunal members may take into consideration the knowl-
edge, the source, and the means of information of the several wit-
nesses, their interest or lack of interest, their candor or lack of
candor, any bias or lack of bias manifested, the manner of testifying,
the bearing of the witness upon the witness stahd, and all facts
and circumstances that are made to appear during the hearing.
(Some of the foregoing statements are included in the standard
court instructions to juries in civil cases).
(30) The tribunal acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. The tribunal
is not held by the law to all the technicalities, niceties, refinements,
discriminations, and restrictions applicable to judges of courts of
record in conducting court trials, but it must at all times look at all
matters from the standpoint of substance as well as form and be
certain that the hearing is conducted and the matter disposed of with
fairness, honesty, and impartiality.
(31) The members throughout the proceeding must in all mat-
ters use their discretion and judgment and do justice to all concerned.
(32) The essential, fundamental elements of a fair trial in a
court of record must guide the tribunal and be reasonably observed
throughout the proceeding.
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(33) Above all, neither the tribunal as a whole, nor any mem-
ber, should pre-judge the charges.
(34) No member of the tribunal is disqualified by his having
some acquaintance with the particular employe and his work, as the
members of the tribunal are usually employers of the dischargee
and in large measure prescribe his duties and responsibilities. The
members should generally disregard any prior information or knowl-
edge, and determine the issues upon the record, the testimony, and
the argument.
(35) Before a public employe having permanent tenure can be
discharged, legal cause must exist, the cause must be substantial,
just, consequential, and sufficient as distinguished from being merely
subterfuge or fanciful, conjectural, political, religious, or otherwise
insufficient.
(36) Among the causes for discharge recognized in the law are:
(a) Neglect or improper performance of duties; (b) incom-
petence; (c) failure to discharge properly the responsibilities of
the position; (d) failure to perform the duties in harmony with
the lawful instructions and orders of superiors; (e) failure to
perform the duties in harmony with fellow-employes; (f) violation
of any valid rule or regulation of the employer; (g) insubordination
towards superiors; (h) persistent lack of discretion and display
of ill-temper; (i) persistent discourteous acts or language toward
fellow-employes or members of the public frequenting the place of
employment; (j) persistent actions or conduct detrimental to the
best interests of the employer or the public; and (k) any other
substantial cause.
(37) The tribunal must make findings as to which, if any, of the
charges are properly proved. It should bear in mind that in most
cases the findings of fact cannot be disturbed by a court if the
evidence under any reasonable view sustains the findings. The courts
in reviewing the actions of these tribunals are limited to passing upon
jurisdictional requirements, including the question as to whether ample
cause for discharge has been proved.
(38) The tribunal must make and file a written decision. As a
general rule, it is wise for the members to take up multiple charges,
one by one, and dispose of them by formal or informal vote. The
findings and decisions may be made by motions or resolutions as
distinguished from formal court findings and decisions.
If the foregoing rules and guides are all reasonably observed,
due process of law will be accorded; and it must be remembered
that if in any material manner due process of law be denied, the
court, upon review, will vacate the discharge or other tribunal action.
[Vol. 29
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The constitutional right to due process of law does not include the
right to appeal. Whether the right of review by the courts and an
appeal therefrom to the Supreme Court exists, depends upon the
applicable statutes.
Court review is generally by special proceeding, mostly by cer-
tiorari, sometimes by mandamus. In certiorari, evidence outside the
record is inadmissible.
18 30 Am. Juris. 783; 18 C. J. 27-29; 25 C. J. 1133; 46 C. J. 993; 56 C. J. 409; 16
C. J. S. 1140, 1200, 1252, 1265, 1402, 1477, 1506; McQuillin, Municipal Corpora-
tions, 2d ed., Rev. Vol. 11 (1939) 483; 15 R. C. L. 530; 22 R. C. L. 572; Andrews
v. King, 77 Me. 224, (1884) ; Arbogast v. Weber, 249 Ky. 20, 60 S. W. 2d 144
(1933) ; Beavers v. Inman. 35 Ga. App. 351, 133 S. E. 275 (1926) ; Boullioum v.
Little Rock, 17 Ark. 489, 3 S. W. 2d. 334 (1928) ; Butler v. Scholefield, Super-
visor, 54 Cal. App. 217, 201 Pac. 625 (1921); Clark v. Blochowiak, 241 Wis.
236, 5 N. W. 2d 772 (1942) Corrigan v. News Bedford, 250 Mass. 334, 145 N. E.
530 (1924) ; Dickey v. Civil Service Commission, Iowa, 205 N. W. 961 (1925) ;
Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 142 N. W. 595 (1913) ; Fetters v. Guth et al.,
221 Iowa 359, 265 N. W. 625 (1936) ; Finch v. Fractional School Dist. etc., 225
Mich. 674, 196 N. W. 532 (1924); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 223 Wis. 635, 271 N. W. 385 (1937) ; Hall v.
Thayer, 105 Mass. 219 (1870); Hawkins v. Common Council of Grand Rapids,
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